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Abstract: Co-working pioneer WeWork, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
The We Company, grew meteorically through an extremely aggressive 
building and master-lease acquisition strategy over the past several 
years. Substantial, early stage funding from SoftBank, a Japan-based 
high-tech venture capital investment bank, reinforced WeWork’s 
unicorn status. But was WeWork’s business model truly unique, 
bringing with it the promise of a very profitable real estate operating 
company in the future? Or was it the company’s early stage, venture 
capital-fueled meteoric growth—without a solid business plan for how 
that growth and market dominance might translate to a financially stable 
and profitable operating entity over the long run—that made it the shiny 
red firetruck in the toy store window that attracted investor attention? 
I. Overview 
 In Session Two of the SITIE2020 Symposium: Innovating the Built Environment, Ryan 
Mathisen presented his research on how the Securities Act of 1933 helped expose both the flaws 
of and extraordinary risks posed by WeWork’s business model as it prepared to issue an initial 
public offering (IPO). Mathisen began his presentation with a brief overview of WeWork’s 
founding, as well as SoftBank’s subsequent involvement in propelling the start-up to market 
dominance.1 He proceeded to explain and explore the problematic portions of the WeWork IPO 
and ultimately concluded that WeWork’s story should serve as a cautionary tale about the risks of 
“chasing unicorns” to both start-up companies and venture capitalists. 
II. The History of Stock Market Regulation 
Stock market regulations, particularly the Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act), have played 
an important role in providing current and potential investors with complete and accurate 
information so as to reduce the amount of speculation required in pricing companies. 86 years after 
the '33 Act was passed, this very law would help disclose the extraordinary risks associated with 
WeWork’s business model and lead to the incredible devaluation of the company—from an 
inexplicable $47 billion to a mere $3 billion. Accordingly, WeWork’s fall from grace can be 
explicitly linked to the disclosures required by the '33 Act, specifically the S-1 Registration Filing. 
The '33 Act was first enacted to help restructure the economy during the Great Depression 
after the Wall Street crash of 1929. The crash, although not the only cause, played a large role in 
1 SoftBank Group Corp.is a Japanese multinational conglomerate holding company headquartered in Tokyo. 
SoftBank owns stakes in many technology, energy, and financial companies. SoftBank began as a software 
distributor in 1981 and entered the publishing business in 1982. It went public in 1994, and began investing in 
internet services, like as Yahoo in 1996.  Most recently, SoftBank launched its Vision Fund, the world's largest 
technology-focused venture capital fund, with over $100 billion in capital. 
sparking the severe economic downturn. During the 1920s, speculation of publicly traded 
companies was rampant and far exceeded the actual value of individual stocks. Company owners 
and stockbrokers stood to profit substantially from the inflated value of stock and oversold the 
value of companies without having to disclose the underlying financial information. This wild 
speculation led banks to lend large sums of money, often 75% of a stock’s price, to promote and 
encourage stock purchases. Unfortunately, as unemployment rose and the agricultural sector 
struggled with a period of poor crop yields, people panicked and rushed to sell their over-valued 
stocks, triggering a sell-off. 
The United States Congress viewed wild speculation as the cause of the 1929 crash. 
Members of Congress reacted by passing the '33 Act, which generally required companies to 
disclose four key pieces of information to investors: (1) a description of the company's properties 
and businesses; (2) a description of the security to be offered for sale; (3) information about the 
management of the company; and, (4) financial statements certified by independent accountants. 
An underlying premise of the '33 Act was to give investors key financial information before they 
invest in securities because the more information available, the less speculation is needed. This 
required information is both broad and specific and requires that audited Financial Statements be 
filed with the SEC as part of the registration process. Expanding off of the ’33 Act, the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 then imposed quarterly, annual, and episodic filings in order for a 
registered company to remain publicly traded. 
Since the '33 Act, there have been several other changes and additions to the regulatory 
landscape of issuance and trading of securities, including: The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(mentioned above); the Investment Company Act of 1940; the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act; the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002; the Dodd Frank Act of 2010; 
and, the Jumpstart Our Businesses Act of 2012 (JOBS Act). Most significantly, the JOBS Act, 
which was intended to reduce the regulatory burdens for “emerging growth companies,” allows 
such companies to provide only two years of the required financial records instead of the five years 
as required by the '33 Act. The JOBS Act also exempts companies from the pay ratio requirements 
and executive compensation disclosures that were added with the Dodd Frank Act. Ultimately, and 
in pertinent part, the JOBS Act exempted certain start-up companies, like WeWork, from 
complying with the full requirements of the ’33 Act. 
III. The History of WeWork 
WeWork primarily conducts business in the office-sharing or “Space-as-a-Service” 
market. Typically, companies either directly purchase or lease entire buildings or entire floors of 
buildings to run their business; however, smaller companies do not have the financial resources to 
do the same. The Space-as-a-Service providers started out by addressing the needs of these smaller 
businesses by master-leasing entire buildings or floors, building out smaller spaces, and offering 
subleases or drop-in memberships to smaller companies that may only need a certain amount of 
space on a floor. Accordingly, WeWork enters into long-term commercial master-leases, renovates 
then subleases (or subleases then renovates, depending upon the terms of the transaction) that space 
to prospective occupiers, often on a much smaller scale. As Space-as-a-Service providers, 
particularly WeWork, became increasingly adept at becoming the Landlord for smaller occupants, 
in addition to servicing the needs of entrepreneurs and one and two-employee users, larger, 
potential clients--including those requiring one or more full floors in the company's master-leased 
buildings--began to take notice, and started working with these SaaS companies as their de facto 
corporate real estate departments, finding and building-out custom office spaces for regional and 
local offices throughout the United States. As a consequence of this strategic expansion of its client 
base, and the size of the Space-as-a-Service transactions in which it engaged, WeWork now counts 
among its client-tenants very large corporations (i.e. enterprise members) whereby WeWork 
addresses and customizes their office space needs in various commercial real estate markets.2 
WeWork was founded in 2010 by Adam Neumann and Michael McKelvey, and it 
experienced rapid growth and received its first large capital investment in 2012 from Benchmark.3 
Over the next few years, WeWork continued its impressive growth and received more and more 
capital investments.4 In 2017, SoftBank, a Japanese technology investment fund, announced an 
investment of around $4 billion in WeWork. In 2019, a few months before filing the paperwork 
for its IPO, SoftBank valued WeWork at a whopping $47 billion. Unfortunately, because SoftBank 
had already pumped billions of dollars into the company, it had significant incentive to inflate 
WeWork’s value ahead of an IPO. A higher valuation would allow SoftBank to claim a positive 
return on its investment and to sell its current interest in the company to new investors at higher 
rates. SoftBank’s valuation of WeWork ultimately proved to be a “house of cards” after investors 
were able to explore and analyze the details of WeWork’s financial and risk disclosures required 
by the ‘33 Act. 
IV. Problems Revealed by the S-1 Registration Filing 
After WeWork’s required disclosures were filed, potential investors found significant 
issues in each of the general components of required information under the '33 Act. Most 
importantly, the financial disclosures showed both that WeWork had a history of extraordinary 
losses, often spending twice as much as it earned, and that there were instances of egregious self-
dealing. WeWork essentially put forth a “just trust us” plan to potential investors: “Our 
management will have broad discretion in the application of the net proceeds of this offering, and 
investors will be relying on the judgment of our management in this regard.” 
First, there were numerous eyebrow-raising issues with the description of the company’s 
properties and businesses. Although WeWork claimed to be a technology company, their business 
model was hardly revolutionary; instead, it merely mirrored traditional real estate business 
models—lease property to sublease it to make a profit—but at a pretty remarkable scale, in terms 
of transaction volume and geographic coverage. Additionally, the disclosure revealed a number of 
pet projects unrelated to the business as a whole. Even worse, the disclosure of risks to the business 
was over thirty pages long.  Among WeWork’s potential investment risks were: 
2 According to The We Company’s S-1 filing, enterprise members accounted for 32% of WeWork’s total 
membership and 38% of its service revenue for the year ending December 31, 2018. 
3 Prior to founding WeWork, Adam Neumann and Michael McKelvey created Green Desk in 2008. Green Desk was 
also a shared-workspace business focusing on sustainability, which they founded in 2010. The pair sold their interest 
in Green Desk and using the funds along with a $15 million investment from Brooklyn real estate developer Joel 
Schreiber for a 33% interest in the company, they founded WeWork in 2010. 
4 Prior to SoftBank’s initial investment, WeWork’s investors as of 2014 included J.P. Morgan Chase & Co, T. Rowe 
Price Associates, Wellington Management, Goldman Sachs Group, the Harvard Corporation, Benchmark, and 
Mortimer Zuckerman, former CEO of Boston Properties. Further, in March 2016, WeWork raised $430 million in a 
new round of financing from Legend Holdings and Hony Capital, valuing the company at $16 billion. 
• “We have a history of losses and, especially if we continue to grow at an accelerated 
rate, we may be unable to achieve profitability at a company level the foreseeable 
future”; 
• “We may not be able to compete effectively with others”; and 
• “We have engaged in transactions with related parties, and such transactions present 
possible conflicts of interest that could have an adverse effect on our business and 
results of operations.” 
The last risk included numerous instances of self-dealing in which the executive board and Adam 
Neumann engaged. These transactions included company leases with at least four of Mr. 
Neumann’s properties and the company’s purchase of the trademark rights from Mr. Neumann for 
$5.9 million to use the word “We.” Prior to the IPO, Mr. Neumann sold a significant number of 
shares (totaling roughly $362 million) without allowing company employees to do the same, 
presumably so that the company valuation would remain inflated. Mr. Neumann also took out 
numerous loans against the value of his shares in the company, one of which was a $500 million 
line of credit secured by pledges of stock. 
Secondly, the description of the security offered for sale was problematic in that it disclosed 
that Adam Neumann would retain majority control of the company even after the company went 
public. This disclosure is problematic for potential investors because it effectively means that any 
investors would be subject to Mr. Neumann’s decision-making, good or bad. Also, the disclosure 
about the management of the company gave potential investors pause for concern because it 
allowed Mr. Neumann to not only retain control over the board of directors (i.e. the shareholder’s 
voice in the company), but it also provided for a succession plan in which Mr. Neumann’s wife 
would have significant authority in selecting a new CEO without input from the board of directors. 
Lastly, and arguably most importantly, the financial disclosures revealed a company that 
was bleeding cash and had yet to turn a profit. In just comparing revenue against non-growth-
related expenses and lease expenses, lease costs and administrative costs alone outstripped the 
company’s revenue. WeWork also revealed that it signs relatively long-term leases (e.g. 15-year 
terms), so the company had roughly $47 billion in lease commitments but only $4 billion in 
committed revenue. Controversially, WeWork attempted to hide these losses by using a metric 
called a Contribution Margin.5 This metric allowed WeWork to deduct building and lease expenses 
from the company’s overall expenses to show a relatively strong profitability. It is worth noting 
that Uber used the same metric in its IPO filing, but Uber has yet to achieve profitability. 
Ultimately, the disclosure requirements of an 86-year-old law helped reveal a company 
that was plagued by erratic spending, incredible self-dealing, questionable long-term profitability, 
and seemingly insurmountable losses. Arguably, these required disclosures, and the conclusions 
they supported, saved potential investors from inevitable catastrophe. In essence, the ‘33 Act did 
what it was intended to do. 
 
5 Contribution margin is a product’s price minus all associated variable costs, resulting in the incremental profit 
earned for each unit sold. The total contribution margin generated by an entity represents the total earnings available 
to pay for fixed expenses and to generate a profit. 
V. Where is WeWork Now?
As a result of the disclosure requirements of the '33 Act, WeWork’s IPO ultimately failed.6 
A company that was once valued as much as Target is now worth only a fraction of that. Moreover, 
at the time of this presentation, The We Company, WeWork’s parent company, has withdrawn 
their IPO application at the request of SoftBank. Both Mr. Neumann and other executives were 
pushed out, although Mr. Neumann received a “golden parachute” exit package valued at an 
incredible $1.7 billion. After the failed IPO, SoftBank chose to bail out the company with an 
infusion of $9.5 billion, in addition to its existing investment of $5 billion prior to the IPO, at a 
time when WeWork was only valued at around $8 billion, putting SoftBank’s overall investment 
in WeWork “underwater.” 
The future of WeWork is very uncertain: As of April 2020, SoftBank terminated an 
additional tender offer of $3 billion. WeWork’s prospects have darkened even further since the 
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which may very well change the landscape of office work 
forever and ultimately eliminate the office-sharing model altogether.  
6 The We Company filed its Form S-1 Registration Statement with the SEC on August 14th, 2019. Less than two 
months later, the company filed to withdraw its IPO on September 30th, 2019. 
